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The "Friuli Model" and modern post-earthquake reconstructions in the Mediterranean Basin: at the beginning of an endogenous and ecological approach

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Abstract. Post-earthquake reconstructions may represent fundamental milestones in the "science of territory" because they provide lessons not only on the basic reasons for risk prevention but also on the evolution of the relationship between human thought, territory and nature.
Grammichele in Val di Noto, Sicily, after the 1693 earthquake, provides an important example of pre-modern reconstruction, while that of Lisbon, following the 1755 earthquake, adopts the essence of the modern capitalist European city. The reconstruction of Messina, following the earthquake of 1908, inaugurates the Italian contemporary story of "infinite reconstruction", in a sense, a return to pre-modern situations. After the Second World War, in the nineteen sixties, we saw the "late modernist" reconstructions of Agadir in Morocco, and of Skopje in Macedonia (then Yugoslavia). Other emblematic cases of reconstruction are that of Longarone after the hydrogeological disaster of Vajont in 1963: "where it was but not as it was", and that of Gibellina, after the Belice earthquake in 1968: "neither where it was, nor how it was".
The case of Friuli, following the 1976 earthquake, represents a turning point in the history of modern post-earthquake reconstructions: it is at the beginning of a new endogenous and ecological approach to reconstruction. The *primum movens* probably lies in the fact that the model has placed, at the centre of reconstruction, the "microcosmic" values of place, work and home as representing the complexity of the whole.
The «Friuli model» is a highly successful model but has, unfortunately, remained isolated as the central State continually tries to extend its powers from emergency situations to the "big business" of reconstruction.

Keywords. Post-earthquake reconstruction model, Friuli model, modernist model, endogenous-ecological model.

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1. Introduction. With reference to the Mediterranean Basin and Southern Europe, this paper seeks, at a preliminary level of research, to argue that:

a) post-earthquake reconstructions mark, as milestones, the evolution of human thought and action in the relationship with territory and nature (Berlin 1994; Bauman 2017);
b) the "Friuli Model", after the earthquake of 1976, seems to have been the first model of reconstruction to "close the curtain" on the "modernity" imposed by princes, emperors or the central State, avoiding both the modern urban utopias and introducing an effective and civil "endogenous and ecological model" of reconstruction, executed in a few years with no imposed master plan;
c) the "Friuli Model" has remained, however, an isolated *unicum*, particularly if we consider the case of L'Aquila's reconstruction after the 2009 earthquake, which, for various reasons, represents a step backwards;
d) more generally, it accounts for an historical process that is anything but linear yet certainly signals advances not only in human settlement seismic safety terms, but also in terms of urban "civility" and culture and, perhaps, in terms of more effective and shared "spatial planning".

Typical nodes of any spatial planning process seem to be:

1) the relationship between the "spatial design" and the "design" of the planning process in itself (Faludi 1987; Faludi, van der Valk 1994);
2) the relationship between the effectiveness of the process and the safeguarding of cultural values and local diversities and identities (particularly in the relationship with history and nature) (Knieling, Othengrafen 2009);
3) the balance between local communities' right to participate, on their own, in decisions concerning their future, and the inevitable intervention from the central State that addresses and regulates the more general processes.

These also appear to be the essential nodes of every reconstruction process. This paper investigates how reconstructions, even through their historical evolution, have responded to these nodes and where possible innovations may have affected, directly or indirectly, the theories of ordinary spatial planning.

In 1693, Prince Carlo Maria Carafa, President of the Parliament of Sicily (at the time part of the Kingdom of Spain), rebuilt the ancient city of Occhiolà, destroyed by an earthquake in Val di Noto, Eastern Sicily, with the new name of Grammichele. It was a complete reconstruction, realised according to the imagination of a late feudal prince who followed the formal criteria of a perfect "ideal city" of the Renaissance. In 1755 an earthquake of unprecedented magnitude destroyed Lisbon. The Prime Minister of the Portuguese Empire, the Marquis of Pombal, charged with rebuilding the city, set up a reconstruction of great historical importance. To react to the "cruelty" and unpre-

dictability of nature, it represented (in its formal and functional aspects) the will of the modern mercantilist and capitalist western city, meant to dominate not only the sea but also nature as a whole. The reconstruction of Messina, after the earthquake of 1908, in contrast, inaugurated the all-Italian history of endless reconstructions, where the reconstruction, without clearly defined responsibilities, became the opportunity to create a "permanent emergency economy". In the nineteen sixties we saw the reconstruction of the city of Agadir in Morocco and that of Skopje, capital of the Republic of Macedonia (then Yugoslavia). They were both reconstructions situated in an intermediate position between modernity and post-modernity: the master plans of a modernist matrix (in Agadir even Le Corbusier intervened, while the master plan for Skopje was by Kenzo Tange) confronted and clashed with the different instances and identities expressed by the affected populations, producing somewhat controversial results. In order to have a reconstruction model that "closes the curtain" on the "modernity" imposed by princes, emperors or the central State and avoids modern urban utopias, we must arrive at the reconstruction of Friuli (north-east Italy), after the earthquake of 1976. This was an "endogenous-ecological model" of reconstruction, executed without any imposed master plan in just ten years. The result was effective but also "civil" in its quality. It has remained, however, an isolated *unicum* model, particularly if we consider the case of the reconstruction of L'Aquila, after the 2009 earthquake, which represents, for many aspects, a step backwards.

This paper, therefore, focuses on the importance of reconstruction in the search for not solely effective solutions, but also ones that are compatible with local territorial structures and identities (both historical and natural) and with the democratic principles of true bottom-up participation in reconstruction decisions.

2. An *excursus* on some modern reconstruction cases in the Mediterranean Basin and in Southern Europe. Grammichele is the name of the new city, rebuilt in 1693 a few kilometres from the ancient city of Occhiolà in Val di Noto in Sicily, thanks to the will and commitment of Prince Carlo Maria Carafa, President of the Sicilian Parliament, at the time part of the Kingdom of Spain. Together with the principles of an antiseismic urbanism (large squares, wide streets, low houses, etc.) the "city" (at the time numbering a few thousand inhabitants) was rebuilt as a new "foundation" city, with a regular hexagonal shape plan (similar to the fortified cities of the Baroque period) and following the formal criteria of the Renaissance "ideal city". It is a model of effective reconstruction both from the point of view of seismic safety (given the knowledge of the time) and that of urban completeness. But its form, more than a city, represents a pure, abstract concept become reality. The city is rebuilt at the behest of a prince who represents a Catholic king who,

in turn, represents God on earth. Therefore, historically, it represents an unrepeatable *unicum*.

The reconstruction (following the earthquake, and then the fire and the tsunami) of Lisbon, in 1755, was directed by Sebastião José de Carvalho and Melo, better known as the Marquis of Pombal, Prime Minister of the Empire of Portugal, at the time holding an absolute power of the seas. The disaster of Lisbon (more than 60 thousand dead in a population of just over 250 thousand inhabitants) profoundly shook the greatest minds of the time and proved the source of fundamental philosophical reflections from the main exponents of the Enlightenment (Voltaire dedicated a poem to it and his greatest work, "Candide"). In the reconstruction, which followed a regular and orthogonal plan with anti-seismic building principles, the main formal and functional models – primarily for the multiplication of urban rentals –, of the emerging modern European city, were applied (Monteiro 2015). But the main universal lesson of that process was that, in order to react to the "cruelty" and unpredictability of nature, the reconstruction had to represent (in its formal and functional aspects) the will of the modern mercantilist and capitalist western city, to dominate not only the sea but even nature as a whole (Bauman 2017). Lisbon's reconstruction stands at the start of a new understanding of man's relationship with natural disasters and, therefore, with "nature" *tout court*. Bauman claims that the Enlightenment and rationalist culture, to emerge definitively, could no longer tolerate the evil effects of nature on human existence. The reaction, therefore, was to launch a war against nature. Since natural disasters (at least in part) are very difficult, if not impossible, to foresee, nature must be subdued wherever possible by imposing the rational order of man over the whole earth. Unlike the reconstruction of Grammichele, which still represents, despite everything, a feudal vision of the world, the reconstruction of Lisbon represents the affirmation of political and economic power that arises from the government of the sea. For this reason the reconstruction of Lisbon represents, in its historical and physical dimension, modernity's absolute "will of power".

The former of the two cited reconstructions can be placed at the sunset of the *ancien régime* while the latter sits at the start of capitalist modernity. The form of the city, in fact, is not something purely abstract to represent political power on earth, but something strictly functional for the triumphant and enlarged reproduction, on a global scale, of mercantile capitalism.

Whatever the case, the modern reconstructions ordered by princes and sovereigns, when they occurred (as we do not have the evidence that all affected settlements were actually reconstructed), were therefore processes, sometimes lengthy in duration, yet complete and conforming to a rational design, detailed and conceptually inspired by a predefined city model. In some ways they must also represent

the greatness and magnificence of the sovereigns that dominated them. The political and technical-administrative responsibilities of the reconstruction were, thus, totally assumed by the sovereign himself and managed through his minister or lieutenant.

The reconstruction of Messina following the 1908 earthquake (comparable to Lisbon in terms of deaths and destruction), in contrast, inaugurated, far more modestly, the all-Italian history of "infinite reconstructions", where the earthquake became an occasion to create a permanent state of emergency specifically designed to boost the economy of a never-ending reconstruction (Saitta 2013).

In Messina, the master plan of Borzì (the name of its technical manager, ed) drew an almost entirely new city, with buildings (including public ones) of modest height (no more than two or three floors), long straight streets, 14 meters wide, orthogonal plans and chessboard blocks. The implementation of the plan continued for thirty years, first under the direction of the Messinese Construction Union, which later became the National Construction Union; then, from 1922, under the direction of the Ministry of Public Works[1]. Later, in the 1920s and 1930s, the rationalist plan of Borzì was distorted by the monumentalism imposed by the academics of the "Roman School": an architecture halfway between Modernism and Classicism, conjugated with the search for an anti-seismic technology, which sought to represent a solid reference for future building regulations (Tacconi 2016). The Borzì plan, intended to be operational for twenty-five years (approved in 1911, it should have expired in 1936), lasted until the mid-1970s. Yet parts of those temporary settlements still exist today and have, over time, being completed. In the case of Messina, it is possible that an excessive, decades-long reconstruction, involving the relevant and decisive responsibility of the state, has become, according to some, an occasion to create a "permanent state of emergency", accompanied by a parallel and infinite "reconstruction economy" (Saitta 2013).

Yet, even in the case of Messina, the main aim still seemed to be, as in the cases of Grammichele and Lisbon – beyond the outcomes, and obviously within their due proportions – that of "redesigning the city", according to already established schema, to make it safer (wide streets, wide plazas and low houses), more efficient (through the orthogonal spatial arrangement), and more beautiful (in particular through monumentality). Technically this was achieved through the planning tool of a unitary and comprehensive master plan, inevitably managed top-down.

But the Messina experience incorporates, in the city's reconstruction, the ordering role of the national state. The presence of the state had already manifested itself in the planning and construction of the nineteenth-centu-

[1] The Ministry of Public Works, from then on, will not leave a good name of itself in Italian reconstructions.

ry city, not only, as has been said, in Lisbon, but also, for example, in the planning of Barcelona, where Ildefonso Cerdà was in charge on behalf of the Madrid government, and in Paris, where Baron Haussmann was in charge on behalf of the emperor Napoleon III. In both cases, the state displayed the role of major public investor and also the greatest promoter of increased capitalist reproduction through new urbanisation processes (Harvey 2008). In the case of Messina, however, the role of the state seems quite different. There was probably an intention to permanently control the local urban economies in order to extract the economic surplus necessary for the enlarged reproduction of the central state itself.

For several decades, the Italian people paid "supplements" on numerous taxes to finance the reconstruction of Messina. But the huge sum collected, for the most part, was removed from its destination and used for other purposes. This, in turn, compromised the reconstruction of Messina and other areas affected by the 1908 earthquake. The weakness of local ruling classes and the historical absence of a modern and efficient administrative system represent the other side of the coin. In other words, the bases for the "endless reconstruction" over the last century, in Messina and in other areas of Southern Italy, were generated, on the one hand, by a state which, in the reconstructions, saw the opportunity to replenish its own coffers and feed its central elites, and, on the other, by local elites (political and business) who preferred to take advantage of the few resources that the state bestowed rather than assume their own responsibilities, change the framework of the local political and economic powers, and demonstrate that another way to rebuild was possible. The case of Messina represents a perverse approach to reconstruction: the aim was not to reconstruct well and in a short time but to rather prolong, for as long as possible, a local economy dependent on the continuous flow of state public resources.

The cases of Agadir (1960) and Skopje (1963) are emblematic because they produced new discontinuities in post-disaster planning. The earthquake hit Agadir, an ancient maritime city on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, claiming thousands of victims and razing the ancient *kasbah* to the ground. The disaster hit the city at a delicate moment in the Kingdom of Morocco's history. In the difficult search for autonomy, not only political, from French colonial dependence, reconstruction became the occasion for the affirmation of a new national identity (Bernasconi 2017). The King of Morocco, declaring the start of the reconstruction, issued the lines of the reconstruction plan and the work was assigned to a High Commissioner for Reconstruction. After several proposals were received from abroad (even Le Corbusier was invited to present ideas) a group of Moroccan designers was finally put in charge of the plan under the supervision of government bodies. The planners in charge saw that Agadir presented the opportunity to develop

an "exemplary plan". The plan was based on the functional principles of the Charter of Athens, but attention to local settlement traditions and cultures was also considered of prime importance. This aim did not impede, in the end: "the building being systematically expropriated, ignoring all individual interests, in order to realize a unitary and articulated urban design" (Bernasconi 2017, 139).

Based on planning models taken from northern Europe (in particular the "Finger Plan" of Copenhagen), an ambitious landscape plan was proposed, in an African context, to integrate the reconstruction areas with the coastal strip and the natural environment behind it. A system of urban green that, from the coastal strip, dates back to the valleys of the hills behind it, had to constitute the element of unification of the different parts of the city which, in turn, followed layouts conforming to the physical characteristics of the soils. While the landscape and the historical and natural identities seem to be prominent features of the Agadir reconstruction plan, the outcomes were, however, not entirely positive: "despite the designers' best intentions, five decades of administrations more attentive toward the economic interests, rather than the preservation of the site's identity, led to an Agadir very different from what was originally expected" (Bernasconi 2017, 141).

Also in the case of the modernist, post-colonial, pro-European reconstruction plan of Agadir, we cannot avoid the sensation that something substantial, connected with the local cultures and identities, had been neglected by the city planning and the reconstruction process. The substantial success of the reconstruction and subsequent indubitable tourism development of the city are, at the same time, both the cause and effect of an (to some extent, inevitable) artificial new landscape and abstract urban design. Post-colonial Africa, in this case, looked to the northern European planning experiences for models of urban development. But it could be said that the international and cosmopolitan modernist approach, notwithstanding its indifference to time and place, was intrinsically rather more sensitive to the local cultures and identities.

Reconstruction after the earthquake in Skopje (1963) was also successful, but with all the ambiguities typical of modernism. Following the earthquake, and given Yugoslavia's important international position as an "unaligned country" (in a context dominated and threatened by the "cold war" between East and West), Skopje became a symbolic city of brotherhood and international aid. Its reconstruction inevitably assumed a political-symbolic meaning for a future of peace and brotherhood among peoples, including through the promotion of international scientific institutions. The UN and its organisations, therefore, played a decisive role in this process. The earthquake (one thousand dead, 150 thousand homeless) heavily damaged, though without completely destroying, a large number of buildings. This led to choices of systematic demolition that

wouldn't impede important technical developments in the repair of traditional masonry. The technical cultures and experiences that converged in the planning and management of Skopje's reconstruction were various: the international culture of architecture and urban planning (also supported by agencies such as UNESCO), as well as the professional and managerial culture developed in Poland following its post-war reconstruction (in particular that of Warsaw), and a certain professional culture developed in the modern Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Home 2007).

The master plan for the reconstruction of Skopje, therefore, assumed an importance that extended beyond the borders of Yugoslavia as well as the narrow borders of a post-disaster planning. The elaboration of the master plan was guided by the recommendations of an international Jury, and its ambitions were macroscopic. (The long-term dimensional forecasts, post 2000, were based on 4 million inhabitants, while the population today is only half a million). The settlement model was "spread out" but with areas of high population density; the implementation was totally regulated by the state in a predominant regime of public property land; the dimensions of the residential areas were planned on the basis of functional thresholds and hierarchies of service centres; for the construction of new residential buildings, prefabrication systems of Soviet design were adopted; public transport was based on certain axial routes and on a city bus service, while the railway network was transformed and a new railway station was built; the areas along the Vardar river were protected by new buildings and destined for recreational and sporting functions. Moreover, a group of Japanese architects coordinated by Kenzo Tange, together with a group from Zagreb, won the international competition to design the new city centre. Respect for different cultural traditions and ethnic minorities were recognised as important, however, planners "wanted the slums cleared where possible, and the people to be "re-educated" to accept high-rise and medium-rise housing" (Home 2007, 18). A gradual levelling-off in family sizes, as well as housing traditions, were inevitably used to accustom the slums' inhabitants to the housing standards of the planned city in a top-down manner. Many families were reluctant to move to new homes with housing standards that were so different from traditional ones (where, for example, there were no vegetable gardens or small gardens). Families and communities were consequently shattered and scattered. However, reconstruction was largely completed by 1980 and the city was to be spacious and well organised (Home 2007). In the end, the outcome can be considered a mixed model: partly rational-Soviet state centralism and partly western "master planning" with strong suggestions of the "modern movement" and of "social engineering". Little remains today of the old pre-earthquake city, and the relationship with local identities and popular participation remains controversial and questionable.

Agadir, first, and then Skopje, sit at the highest evolutionary point of international style in architecture and of city planning in urbanism. But they also highlight their weaknesses: an essentially exogenous, technocratic, top-down and "time-space indifferent" approach.

3. The "Friuli Model" of reconstruction. A little more than ten years later, in Friuli (north-eastern Italy), the modernist model was to be decisively overcome. In 1976 violent earthquake shocks struck the northern part of the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region, leaving a thousand dead and 100 thousand homeless.

The rebuilding of Friuli was undoubtedly a successful reconstruction that interrupted the endless series of reconstructions in twentieth century Italy. This success is seen as an almost epic result, both inside and outside Friuli and, as such, continues to be perceived and analysed (Senate of the Italian Republic 2017) even if not replicated. From this experience and from the reflection that has developed from it (Di Sopra 1992, 1998, 2016) the conceptualisation defined as the "Friuli Model" of reconstruction was born. The Friuli model consists essentially of three components (Fabbro 2017):

1. The systematic, large-scale application of new techniques for the anti-seismic repair of traditional masonry buildings. This interrupts the structural engineering "diktat" of the time, which states that the safety of buildings can only be assured with new buildings in reinforced concrete (the "break" comes also on the heels of the experience gained from existing masonry repairs in Skopje. A "technological transfer" of that experience was carried out through contacts with the University of Ljubljana) (Carpenedo 2017).
2. A principle of reconstruction of definitive settlements ("where it was and as it was"), also made possible by those techniques. This principle of reconstruction breaks both culturally with the tyranny of the "modern" in architecture and urbanism, and with the reconstructive models imposed by the state (the top down "master plans"). "Where it was and as it was" means that it is possible to repair and recover the existing buildings, but also that historically consolidated small settlements possess a "natural" order that survives catastrophes[2]. This is, perhaps one of the first cases, if not the first, in which the local territories demonstrate a refusal to both accept exogenous experiments on their skin and tolerate a top-down, comprehensive and all-encompassing planning (Carpenedo 2017).

[2] Of great value, from this perspective, is the observation by the British geographer David Harvey, according to whom: "The freedom to make and remake our cities and ourselves is […] one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human rights" (Harvey 2008).

3. Political power relations – between central state, regional and local authorities – are strongly decentralised downwards and, in some respects, even reversed. This principle breaks with the tradition of "command and control" from the centre to the periphery. The post-disaster reconstruction, therefore, affirms itself as a social and endogenous fact, which must start from the bottom to enhance and activate all the necessary "social capital" of the territory (including, first of all, its historical and cultural identity) (Carpenedo 2017).

For the reconstruction of Friuli, no "master plans" were adopted: a plan for a "Greater Udine", aimed at concentrating the stricken populations, dispersed in hundreds of small villages and centres, around the barycentric town of Udine, was formulated by architects and urban planners with a modernist culture, but was immediately rejected and no longer discussed. The reconstruction was ultimately governed by certain fundamental national laws, numerous regional laws, regulations and technical documents, a huge number of detailed local plans, and certain territorial planning documents (a form of "district plans" without any conforming value). The general frame of reference was the *Piano Urbanistico Regionale* [Regional Urban Plan], which had been developed before the earthquake and approved two years afterwards. From a political-regulatory point of view, the Friuli Model introduced, perhaps for the first time, a principle of strong "subsidiarity", both vertical (in terms of institutional cooperation between local municipalities, the region and the central state), and horizontal (in terms of public and private cooperation). The whole process was functionally separated (including in responsibility terms) into three main phases: emergency (with the essential role of the central state, particularly for the on-going provision of the large financial resources needed); physical reconstruction (under the responsibility of the local authorities); and socio-economic development (under the direction of the Regional Administration and involving strong social cooperation).

Culturally speaking and in hindsight, the "primum movens" of the "Friuli Model" lies in the fact that an attachment to work, the home and, therefore, the village and community are placed at the front and centre of the reconstruction. Home is the microcosm (oikos) that encompasses the whole and the complexity of the whole. For this reason, the reconstruction of Friuli can be considered the first and most complete "endogenous-ecological" reconstruction. Perhaps, Friuli can also be considered the first "post-modern" reconstruction, not so much in the sense of a narrow post-modernist architecture as in the sense of the theories and practices that break with the exogenous, technocratic, top-down and "time-space indifferent" approaches of modernity.

4. More recent reconstruction approaches in Italy. Following World War II, post-disaster reconstructions in Italy have faced the affected settle-

ment and territorial structures essentially from two alternative points of view (Fabbro 2012):

a. The first perspective generally views the affected structures, particularly those located in rural contexts, as "wrong" situations, where the territorial "distortions" produced by history and geography need to be rationalised (the rationalist model of the Lisbon tradition can be placed at the forefront of this model). In such cases, reconstructions are intended as opportunities for a more or less radical "reformation" of the territory through the application of an exogenous model. The spatial arrangement of the settlement being rebuilt is completely new and often located neither where it was, nor as it was. Extremely emblematic cases are the reconstructions of Longarone after the hydrogeological disaster of Vajont (between Veneto and Friuli) in 1963, and the reconstruction of Gibellina (Sicily) after the Belice earthquake of 1968.
b. The alternative perspective views the affected structures as an inescapable part of the territory and deeply linked and justified by the territory's history and geography itself. If the structures were already part of the territory, then, in the case of any reconstruction, one must look at them as endogenous "matrices", capable of activating a broader perspective of "human ecology" and thus giving a sense to the reconstruction itself (the cases of Friuli after 1976, to some extent Irpinia after 1980, and Umbria and Marche after 1997). The spatial order that must be rebuilt is not a re-founded top-down order but an earlier one ("where it was and as it was").

In more recent years, the reconstruction of L'Aquila after the earthquake of 2009 (300 dead, over 140 thousand people affected), inaugurated a model that cannot be called modernist (if only for the historical characteristics of the city) but where the state regained its centrality and its control powers, despite no longer being able to finance the reconstruction or control the whole process. In fact, its emergency plan generated side effects that risk disabling the entire reconstruction process. For instance, the National Civil Protection agency, plenipotentiary for the emergency and reconstruction process, has declared a shortening of the reconstruction process by eliminating entire phases through the provision of provisional buildings "with the characteristics of the permanent" (Calvi 2009). This is the conceptual foundation of the CASE project, i.e. the "Environmentally Friendly Sustainable Anti-Seismic Complexes" built by the Government's Commissioner and Head of Civil Protection. Those 13,400 people who went to live in those quarters have generated "a new town outside the city" (Mashiko et al. 2017) and will probably no longer need, at least for the next twenty years, to look for other housing. A quarter of the population has been left homeless, including most of the previous inhabitants of L'Aquila's historical centre. Certainly, therefore, a "demand" for the

reconstruction of L'Aquila's historical centre will not come from these people. Indeed, the duplication of the city, conducted under the aegis of a more secure and efficient "new town", seems to have produced, the opposite outcome: an exorbitant consumption of soil and an inefficient dispersion (Di Ludovico 2015).

What has been done in recent months for the post-earthquake reconstruction in Central Italy, including the appointment of a Commissioner for Reconstruction (note: for "reconstruction" and not for the emergency), seems to be following the same path as that of state control – in the name of efficiency and effectiveness – which, since 1908, the Italian state has seemed unable to guarantee. It intervenes from time to time, without a strategy and based on current interests and "on the skin" of the victims, to carry out political and urban experiments that merely serve the political and economic power of the moment.

5. Conclusions. With particular reference to the shift from modernist to post-modernist reconstructions, this analysis of certain post-disaster reconstructions in the Mediterranean basin has highlighted important changes. Essential changes also affect spatial ordering and planning processes. These seem to be, primarily:

1) a relationship between the "urban design" and the "design" of the planning process as a whole, where the latter approach seems to prevail over the former;
2) a balance between the effectiveness of the process (particularly in terms of restoring normality and safe conditions for settled populations) and the safeguarding of social cohesion, cultural values and local identities (in the relationship with history and nature), where a growing attention is dedicated to the social and cultural aspects of the places and the affected communities;
3) a balance between the inevitable intervention of the central state, to finance the process and manage the emergency, and the rights of local communities to participate in decisions concerning their future, where local rights seem to be acquiring growing importance.

As planners it is worth asking, then, what lessons can we learn from these experiences. These are, in fact, also essential nodes of any urban and regional planning and implementation process.

The first question is whether it is possible, in relation to the reconstruction cases studied, to derive general models. The second is whether, from these possible general models, there are directions that are worth following. The answer to the first question is that there are maybe two essential models – one more "exogenous" (modernist) and one more "endogenous" (post-modernist) – which are perhaps not interchangeable or compatible. This is an aspect that needs further investigation, but, over time and organisationally, they must at least partially intersect each other. If the emergency is inevitably exogenous, the reconstruction is pref-

erentially endogenous even though, between one and the other, there can be a partial overlap. The transition from one to the other may imply tensions and conflicts between different types of knowledge and power that must be foreseen and regulated in time with laws for the prevention of the effects of disasters. The financing of the entire process (from emergency to reconstruction) certainly remains the responsibility of the central state. Furthermore, it seems right to reserve emergencies to special, well organised "civil protection" bodies. In the meantime, the reconstruction models, in the strict sense, should be decided and implemented by the local communities. These models must be endogenous and locally managed in order to form a strong empathy with the territory and with its historical-geographical and anthropological identities (today we would say "ecosystemic" and "sustainable"). This would also induce an activation of all the social and territorial capital necessary for the reconstruction. Regarding the second question, one could rather say what it would be better not to do: in principle, what must be avoided is utopian top-down planning, i.e. oriented not so much towards the restoration of security and normality, but rather towards the correction of "distortions" of history and of social and environmental conditions (Berlin 1994). Finally, we must definitively break with the (mostly Italian) drift of "endless reconstructions", to establish, through a national law, the principles of a "civil reconstruction" that must be based: a) on security guarantees for the inhabitants; b) on democratic principles of participation in decisions; and c) on those republican virtues that claim the use of public resources to restore considerable normality within a reasonable time frame.

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